This paper has been written as a basis for a series of interventions on the political and human rights situation in Bangladesh, starting with the virtual conference organised by 71@heart in London on 17 January 2026.
https://paulocasaca.substack.com/p/bangladesh-a-new-venue-for-totalitarianism
Summary
On 12 February, one and a half years after the insurrectional takeover of the country, a referendum and elections will take place, raising the possibility of solidifying the current Jihadi rule into a permanent totalitarian regime. Whereas most actors, internal and external, welcomed the so-called ‘democratic reforms’ of the ‘Nobel Peace Laureate’ at the onset of the self-appointed ruler, most—although not all—have implicitly admitted their misunderstanding in the face of the humanitarian catastrophe that has unfolded since the end of constitutional rule.
This essay examines both the long-term process that led to the 2024 power seizure and the narrative instruments used to justify it. The analysis argues that the degree of reality reversal achieved by this narrative has established a new pattern never attained before, not even by the Soviet regime that inspired Orwell’s masterpiece, nor by the Iranian Islamic Revolution.
The analysis focuses primarily on the international dimension of the process, while also considering possible interpretations from a domestic perspective. From a global standpoint, it examines both the long-standing Western soft spot for Islamist rule and the unbridled devotion to the power of money that swept the world after the collapse of communist doctrine at the end of the twentieth century.
In the final section, recommendations are offered on what needs to change in the international community’s approach to end its promotion of totalitarianism and instead foster humane values.
- The birth of Bangladesh
The South Asian subcontinent, or historical India, was deeply marked in contemporary times by successive Asian and European colonisation movements. The European colonisers—primarily the British—established the current national framework, but earlier colonisations were more significant from a religious-identity perspective. The final stage of European colonial rule (excluding the minor French and Portuguese presences) was marked by “the Partition,” which divided the remaining part of British-ruled colonial India into two countries, one Muslim and the other non-Muslim. In this sense, the most recent colonisation was haunted by its predecessors.
Religious wars ravaged the European continent for centuries. The Peace of Westphalia, which marked the end of one of the most terrifying of these conflicts—the Thirty Years’ War, fought at the heart of Europe—was concluded through a secular agreement. Secularism, however, proved not to be a universal remedy, as it opened the door to nationalism based on ethnic and/or linguistic identity, building walls and armies that brought even greater devastation to the continent in the first half of the twentieth century. The European treaties were conceived as a response to this nationalism, and one may wonder whether the framework that enabled Europe to enjoy a long period of peace and relative prosperity has not now reached its expiry date.
The Indian Partition amounted to a reversal of Westphalian principles, and it is remarkable that a European power favoured, as its final colonial act, what was effectively a recipe for permanent conflict—something Europeans had learned the hard way. Religious supremacism certainly had roots beyond British colonial intent, but the role of the former colonial power in the unfolding tragedy cannot be minimised.
The United Kingdom—and, by extension, the West as a whole—was apparently suspicious of Gandhi’s Congress ideology, believing it might evolve into a form of “saffron communism.” The idea that geopolitics could define artificial borders for purely political purposes—however awkward this may sound—was dominant throughout much of the last millennium and reached its apex at the Berlin Conference on Africa. This logic undoubtedly played a significant role in the design of the Partition.
East and West Pakistan, along with Nepal—considered a reliable ally—and the Himalayan range, were meant to form a strategic barrier to Soviet access to the “warm waters” of the Indian Ocean. The British coloniser, as in the United States, South America, and Southeast Asia, viewed the military as a more reliable partner than democratically elected politicians—another legacy that played a noxious role in the formation of Pakistan.
Mohammad Ali Jinnah, more of an English gentleman than a Muslim leader, believed the operation could succeed through a form of Islamic secularism (he himself was an Ismaili who later moved toward Twelver Shi‘ism, and some even say Sunni Islam). History would reduce this illusion to ashes. He also believed language could serve as a unifying factor and therefore proclaimed Urdu as the new country’s sole official language.
Urdu, developed during Asian colonisation, was a form of creole incorporating Arabic, Turkish, and, fundamentally, Persian elements into local Hindi. The British had granted it official status, and a considerable portion of the colonial administration spoke it.
The geopolitics of Urdu shares similarities with Swahili, another creole language created by Asian colonisers on the East African coast, where Persian, Arabic, and Turkish elements—later joined by European influences—merged with local Bantu languages. Swahili initially existed only in narrow coastal areas where Asian colonisation had been effective, but it expanded dramatically during and after British rule. Today, it is the most widely spoken language in Tanzania and an essential language in Kenya, while remaining a fringe dialect in Mozambique, where it was neither supported by Portuguese nor by Mozambican authorities.
While Swahili’s rise to primary language status was not especially contentious in Tanzania or Kenya, and while Urdu’s imposition met little resistance in most of Pakistan, it proved unacceptable in the Bengali-speaking eastern wing. This was the primary cause of the conflict that ultimately led to Bangladesh’s independence.
Bengali is an Indo-European language, yet distinct from Hindi and other subcontinental languages. Bengali culture and civilisation rank among the most extensive and significant in the world, and resistance to its erasure was the central driver of Bangladesh’s independence. This struggle involved millions of victims, which was only stopped by Indian military intervention.
The 1971 Bangladesh genocide confirmed the ruthless nature of both the Pakistani military and Islamist fanaticism. It was the first post–Second World War genocide. As the 2024 insurrection once again demonstrated, the Bangladeshi national question remains unresolved.
The cooperation, incitement, and silence of the United States, the United Nations, the Muslim world, and the broader West regarding the gravest crime against humanity since the Second World War were never corrected or acknowledged. A crime forgotten is a crime repeated.
- Bangladesh’s poor institutional record
Bangladesh’s subsequent political history has been marked by a poor record on democracy and human rights. The new state struggled to overcome immense challenges, particularly the devastating cyclones of 1974. The inadequate response of Pakistani authorities to the deadliest cyclone ever recorded in the region in November 1970 contributed to the Awami League’s landslide victory in the December elections; similarly, Bangladesh’s own authorities’ poor response to the 1974 cyclones eroded public support for the government.
The August 1975 coup, which murdered Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and his family, inaugurated a political history in which democratic governance and peaceful transfers of power became the exception, while military rule, mob or organised violence, partisan cronyism, attacks on minorities, mass killings, and gross human-rights violations became the norm.
The international community might have recognised that Bangladesh’s problems stemmed less from democracy itself than from the dominance of military and Islamist structures. A comparative analysis of India and Pakistan would have provided valuable insight into Bangladesh’s trajectory.
Instead, the West—particularly the United States—supported Islamist forces and military dictatorships as a means of countering the Soviet threat. Even after the Cold War ended and Islamist supremacism became a primary strategic challenge, Western policy remained essentially unchanged.
This self-defeating attitude is even clearer in Western policy toward Pakistan, including economic, trade, and military support for the coup against Imran Khan’s elected government, tolerance of minority persecution, erosion of civil liberties, and the rise of Islamist violence and terrorism.
From 1991 onward, Bangladesh alternated between governments led by Khaleda Zia of the BNP and Sheikh Hasina of the Awami League. Western diplomatic, military, and autocratic circles reduced the country’s persistent problems to personal animosity between these two women—the so-called “two-ladies theory,” a blend of misogyny and contempt for democratic politics. This view was still prevalent when I first visited Dhaka in 2012.
That was the context in which Muhammad Yunus and his Grameen Bank were awarded the ‘Nobel Peace Prize’ for, supposedly, having invented microcredit. A practice developed over the last thousand years, being publicised as invented by Doctor Yunus and his bank by the end of the twentieth century, is an outlandish claim, even if authored by a distinguished international actor.
One of my earliest childhood memories involves my mother taking small loans to survive: borrowing a thousand escudos and repaying it in eleven monthly instalments of one hundred escudos. The lender, an older woman, would visit for tea, during which my mother tried to conceal her hardship.
As an economist who has dedicated a good part of my life to the issue of money and credit, I read with dismay the nomination procedure, apparently written by someone whose knowledge did not extend beyond the contemporary credit mechanisms of developed countries. The only novelty of the Yunus method was the formal entry of recognised credit institutions into a domain previously dominated by informal actors.
Whereas one might conceive of a business development prize for the achievement, it is odd to see it as the basis for a ‘Nobel Peace Prize’. This idea reflected a general post-communist atmosphere in which business appeared as the magic potion for all human problems.
There is a broad debate – and Court jurisprudence – on the merits of the banking activities of the Grameen Bank and its president. One side of the argument focuses on the usurious rates and the harsh conditions imposed on the creditors. The other side of the argument drowns out facts with a narrative promoted by a cohort of ‘civil society organisations’ supported by UN structures, parroting the politically correct soundbites of our time.
From a genuine Adam Smith perspective, the key issue is not altruism but competition. The Grameen Bank succeeded because it pursued its own interests. Whether this benefited society depended on the existence of open competition and on the business concerned (such as the Grameen Bank or its President) not interfering in public policy.
Nobel Peace Prize nominations are political acts that reflect the choices and priorities of Western actors worldwide. We saw this happening recently with the nomination of a Venezuelan personality, Corina Machado, who is widely perceived as the most representative leader of the democratic opposition of a country considered ripe for launching a democratic process.
The nomination of Muhammad Yunus in October 2006 was followed in January 2007by a military coup aimed at installing him at the head of an unelected government. Muhammad Yunus, though, declined the invitation and gave up launching a new political party, forcing the military to nominate someone with less public opinion clout. The operation failure reflected the difficulties of the ‘anti-two ladies’ campaign.
Despite the intense repression and the arrest of the ‘two ladies’, this dictatorial attempt that lasted two years was not successful, and an election took place on 29 December 2008, from which resulted a government headed by Sheikh Hasina.
Sheikh Hasina’s rule lasted from January 2009 till August 2024, the most extended consecutive government period and, by all indicators of human and economic development, the best political period in the history of Bangladesh.
Barely after its first month in office, her government survived a bloody military coup. She did not confront the security establishment, allowing it a free hand in the fight against terrorism, which allowed the country to register a net security improvement at the expense of human rights. Enforced disappearances and the military control of the Chittagong Hill Tracts region continued, and the government did not implement the agreements with the ethnic minorities of this area. The authorities allowed the military apparatus to continue its business, like in Pakistan.
The domestic International Court Tribunal, created to prosecute the Bangladeshi culprits of crimes of genocide, was paralysed practically since its onset. Under the government of Sheikh Hasina, it resumed its activities, sentencing several Jihadi leaders. Still, otherwise, the authorities did not counter the Islamist fanatic indoctrination that progressed relentlessly during the period.
The relations with the most important rival, the BNP, were complex. Khaleda Zia’s son, and acting president, Tarique Rahman, had been convicted of terrorist activities – specifically for the participation in a terrorist attack that resulted in dozens of fatal victims and other casualties, including Sheikh Hasina herself – but was freed on bail and then escaped to the United Kingdom. The BNP continued its alliance with the central Jihadi organisation, Jamaat-e-Islami, boycotting two of the elections held and denouncing the remaining one as fraudulent.
Both democratic leaders of the Awami League and the BNP offered partial justification for the ‘two-ladies’ theory, as they were unable to move forward with the creation of a rule-of-law, level-playing-field featuring independent and trustworthy institutions, including the national electoral commission.
The absence of a functional opposition stimulated a lack of accountability. The Bangladeshi people hinted that the change of government would not be achieved by the ballot but by the old methods of military interference and violence.
- The recent reign of terror
When I left Dhaka by the end of January 2024, I thought that the new government would not last long. The Islamist International radical network considered the sentencing of prominent Jamaat-e-Islami leaders by Sheikh Hasina an unforgettable sin. After 2018, I started to notice how this network had influenced and even captured the leverage of diplomacy towards the Muslim world within the UN, the US, and the EU, subverting the meaning of human rights.
The Capture of the International and Western institutions by prominent Jihadi actors was partially unveiled within what was called the ‘Qatargate within the European Parliament’, allowing me to understand how a network of Soros-connected NGO, ‘transparency’ cells within the Western press, and ‘human-rights’ initiatives manoeuvred to impose a dystopian vision of the humanist framework of our civilisation, the slandering of the Sheikh Hasina government being one of their primary tasks.
In the meantime, Muhammad Yunus became an international icon and actor of every trendy subject aired in the global arena: from the United Nations Foundation to all sorts of UN or other international committees related to women’s rights, sustainable development, empowering marginalised groups, fighting climate change, or even exorcising the economic system ‘destroying this planet’, there was hardly any part of the woke jargon that one cannot find in Yunus lexicon and institutional roles.
This portrait is in stark contrast with the usurious and humanly insensitive picture that emerges from the Bangladeshi judicial sentences against him, reportedly influenced by Sheikh Hasina’s detestation of his personality and sway exerted on the Bangladeshi judicial system. The reality is that 1.5 years of his rule in the country have proven the well-founded basis for these judicial sentences.
The ability to dissociate discourse from reality, sharply analysed by George Orwell’s writings on the ‘decline of the English language’, is based on the transformation of euphemism into a totalitarian instrument subverting reality perception, and is masterfully clear on the designation of Ministries in the 1984 romance, the Ministry of Truth, the Ministry of Love, or the Ministry of Peace.
The gross reversal of truth was a hallmark of the totalitarian regimes of the twentieth century, namely Stalin’s Soviet Union, which crucially inspired Orwell, as well as the reigns of Hitler, Mussolini, and Mao. Still, none of them campaigned on democracy and human rights, nor did they entirely hide the fundamental nature of their political project. In the Jihadi sphere, this was especially true of Khomeini, famous for his promises of freedom and democracy and for his refusal to assume any political role during his French exile. Notwithstanding, he clearly stated his desire for an Islamic Republic under clerical rule.
If we look at the promises of the protagonists of the Saffron Revolution, be it Yunus or the gathering of fictional ‘reformist students’, there is not a word on Jihad, or even simply about Islamic Rule. The Jihadi vocabulary and terror emerged only after the power grab. After the integration of the ‘Students Reform’ party, endorsed by Yunus, into the Jamaat-e-Islami-led electoral coalition’s lists, it became at last plausible to most observers that the 2024 insurrection was the beginning of a Jihadi takeover of the country.
Along with the political and minorities massacres, the devastation of the cultural and national heritage of the country, the blasphemy persecutions, the ‘Devil’s hunt’ operation persecuting political dissidents, the so-called mob violence, that encompasses pure criminal activities and organised fanatic militia, I found most symbolic the reversal of the ICT from a tribunal prosecuting genocide into one prosecuting its opponents.
Sheikh Hasina was the first and most crucial target of the new ICT, ostensibly, not because she is the living symbol of the country’s independence, or for allowing the original ICT to engage in the task of ending the impunity to the genocide perpetrators, but for the reverse, being responsible for the existing casualties during the 2024 insurrection.
Sheikh Hasina repeatedly expressed her grief for those who fell during the events, and she assumed her part of the political responsibilities by avowing that at a particular stage, ‘things got out of hand’. Still, no one could give any proof of any orders to shoot to kill; all circumstantial evidence points to the contrary.
All the loss of life during these events is regrettable, and a non-partisan and professional assessment of what happened, the investigation of fatalities, including those of the police officers, which several sources estimate to have been several times more important than those of civilians, is essential.
Nevertheless, two main points need attention in this context. The first is that these mass losses of life were an anomaly during the 15 years of Sheikh Hasina’s rule, but this is not the case when we analyse the nation’s history before 2009 and after July 2024. It is preposterous to compare the July uprising with the genocide of 1971. The second is that this was an insurrection to terminate the Constitution and a constitutional government and to install a dictatorship, not the opposite.
Freedom of expression is the second most important prey of the Yunus dictatorship. The jailing and trial of the intellectual and journalist Shahriar Kabir for genocide is also quite symbolic, as he is the most important symbol of the fight for justice to the victims of the genocide and of the denunciation of Jihadism. The dictatorial authorities flatly ignored the UN group decision that called for his immediate release and compensation for his sufferings and stepped up the judicial procedures against him.
The director of one of the two most internationally prestigious Bangladeshi media outlets, the Daily Star, has recently declared that the issue of ‘freedom of expression’ is now irrelevant, and that only the ‘right to live’ remains on the horizon. His declaration came shortly after Jihadists burned down the buildings of his company as well as the facilities of Prothom Alo, the other most prestigious media outlet. According to press reports, dozens of journalists of the two outlets managed to escape alive only after the security forces negotiated with the Islamist militia their escape before the setting of fire to the buildings.
The Daily Star was an unequivocal critic of the Sheikh Hasina government, with which it had an extensive legal battle, and an enthusiastic supporter of Yunus’s takeover. While I was in Dhaka in January 2024, I was surprised to see that it was the only English-language newspaper freely distributed to hotel guests, where most election observers were lodged. Its criticism of the authorities went beyond the reasonable and nurtured accusations I considered absurd. This declaration by the Daily Star’s director is perhaps the best reflection of how public opinion changed in less than a year and a half.
The critical factor for fair and free elections is indeed freedom of expression, along with freedom of association and security for women and minorities. This is why it is impossible to expect anything of the kind for the 12 February vote.
Yunus did understand that a significant flaw of the ‘two-ladies’ strategy was to bring together the ladies who embodied the country’s two major political sensibilities, one progressive, the other conservative, and therefore decided to do his best to count on one of them in the ballot while proscribing and persecuting by all possible means the other. Consequently, he engineered the reversal of the previous judicial condemnation of the acting president of BNP, allowing him to return to the country in time to participate in the elections.
The BNP has always been the closest to the military and the clerical establishment. Otherwise, the financial corruption of the current party president (his mother’s death was officially announced shortly after he landed in Dhaka) is legendary.
Constitutional referenda on non-parliamentary proposals are hallmarks of anti-democratic, authoritarian regimes. The Portuguese Constitutional referendum of 1933 and Hitler’s 1934 referendum on his dictatorial role are two good examples of this rule.
The legitimacy of a Parliament elected under unknown provisions and powers, to be decided by a simultaneous referendum, is a recipe for political instability.
So, even if the Islamists do not enjoy an outright win in the elections, all the conditions are set for a war of attrition to purify the nature of the regime, that is, to consolidate it as a clear Jihadi totalitarian regime.
- Conclusions
The leading actors in what is considered the international community, the UN, the US, and the EU, have had a consistently negative role in the situation of Bangladesh. They are a determining factor in the problem rather than a part of the solution.
It is noteworthy that even the so-called civil society actors, who played a crucial role in demonising the Awami League authorities, have lately significantly nuanced their positions. In contrast, the UN, the US, and the EU did not significantly change their approach, even in the face of the facts on the ground. The latest declaration by the European Union, which considers the upcoming elections free, fair, and inclusive, is just embarrassing for any European citizen.
It is significant that all three actors, using a similar wording, presented their condolences on the assassination of a local ‘student’ leader, Sharif Osman Hadi, in December 2025, while they have kept silent during the multiple crimes against humanity taking place in the country.
None of the institutions did anything to counter the outlandish claims of Indian and opposition responsibility in the assassination that fuelled major acts of violence against the press, the Hindu minority, opposition figures, and even Indian diplomatic representations. They did not react either when the brother of the assassinated leader directly accused the Yunus authorities of the crime.
This diplomatic scandal that united the US, the EU, and the UN occurred simultaneously with a complete breakdown in relations among them due to the Greenland crisis and the new American-sponsored international organisation for peace, intended to replace the UN.
Contrary to widespread belief about global geopolitical calculations, access to raw materials, or other forms of business, I do not think that either factor played a role in the unfolding drama. This has a sole origin, the direct and indirect pressure of Islamist regimes, sometimes crystallised in woke dogmas. That the West is so fragile in the face of modern totalitarian doctrines is more important than the strength of the sponsors of these doctrines.
As some predicted in the wake of the Nazi nightmare that befell humanity, future threats would use far more sophisticated means. The infiltration of totalitarian ideologies within the humanist realm attained its global apex with the actors promoting the 2024 July insurrection.
The well-known pillars of scientific knowledge and humane advancement must pave the way forward, namely:
- Transparency. Whoever acts in the name of the general interest must be fully transparent on their motivations, namely, financial motivations—the lavish sums of money invested in Bangladesh by USAID and other US deepstate bodies. Qatar, or civil society organisations highly dependent on this country’s funds or business opportunities (HRW and the Soros constellation are prime examples), should have made their financial and business links transparent.
- Absence of conflicts of interest, such as the ones identified in point one.
- Professional, rigorous, and independent analysis, which supposes a framework based on freedom of expression and a society less dependent on instantaneous soundbites and more keen on serious work.
- Confrontation of any sort of proclaimed principles with reality on the ground to avoid constructions of fictitious humanitarian advances
- Accompanying the present crisis within the international order, suggesting alternatives and reforms based on clear humanitarian principles.
Paulo Casaca
Paulo Casaca is the Founder and Executive Director of the ‘South Asia Democratic Forum’; founder of the international co-operation association registered in Brussels ARCHumankind, ‘Alliance to Renew Co-operation among Humankind’. Founder and senior partner of the consultancy company on sustainable development registered in Brussels, Lessmeansmore, Land and Energy Sustainable Systems (2010-2020).